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Supply chain differentiation, contract agriculture, and farmers’ marketing 
preferences: the case of sweet pepper in Thailand 
 
Abstract 
There is an emerging body of literature analyzing how smallholder farmers in developing 
countries can be linked to modern supply chains. However, most of the available studies 
concentrate on farm and farmer characteristics, failing to capture details of institutional 
arrangements between farmers and traders. Moreover, farmers’ preferences have rarely been 
considered. Here, we address these gaps by analyzing different market channels for sweet 
pepper in Thailand. Using data from a survey and choice experiment with farmers, we find 
that there is a general preference for marketing options that do not involve a contract. 
Additional provision of inputs and credit can increase the attractiveness of contracts. Yet, the 
most important factor for farmers is to personally know the buyer they deal with, which may 
be related to issues of trust. Some policy implications are discussed. 
 
Keywords: Choice experiment; contract design; farmers’ stated preferences; modern 
agricultural supply chains; Thailand. 
 
1. Introduction 
The transformation of agri-food systems towards high-value supply chains implies a 
modernization of procurement systems in developing countries (Boselie et al., 2003; Reardon 
et al., 2003). Supermarkets in particular increasingly switch from buying through spot-market 
transactions to contractual agreements with farmers, often through specialized intermediaries 
(Balsevich et al., 2006; Berdegué et al., 2005; Neven et al., 2009; Rao and Qaim, 2011). 
There is an emerging body of literature analyzing how smallholders can be linked 
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successfully to modern supply chains (e.g., Asfaw et al., 2009; Henson et al., 2005; Huang et 
al., 2007; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). There are also numerous studies discussing the 
benefits and risks of contract agriculture (Glover, 1987; Gow and Swinnen, 2001; Mangala 
and Chengappa, 2008; Peterson et al., 2001; Simmons et al., 2005; Singh, 2002). However, 
both strands of literature hardly address details of concrete contractual arrangements between 
sellers and buyers in the context of emerging value chains and modernizing retail structures.  
This is considered a drawback, because the design of contracts can crucially affect 
smallholder participation. For instance, contracts imposed by modern retailers often involve a 
number of requirements, like minimum quantities to be delivered or certain quality 
specifications, which are difficult to meet by smallholder farmers. Moreover, lack of credit or 
delayed payment in contract schemes may deter small farms from participating. Depending on 
the availability of other marketing options, smallholders may also simply be reluctant to 
commit themselves to a certain buyer. Such aspects of personal preferences have hardly been 
considered in previous research. With few exceptions (Blandon et al., 2009; Guo et al., 2007; 
Masakure and Henson, 2005), available studies explain farmers’ participation in modern 
supply chains through farm, household, and contextual characteristics, without explicitly 
accounting for subjective attitudes. This implicitly assumes that all farmers would sell in 
modern supply chains, if they were able to. In reality, this may not always be the case. 
This article addresses these research gaps by analyzing trade relations between farmers 
and buyers in different marketing channels, using the example of sweet pepper in Thailand. 
Sweet pepper was introduced in Thailand some 10 years ago, mainly for exports and upscale 
domestic supermarkets. Over time, it gained wider popularity among domestic consumers, so 
that sweet pepper is nowadays also traded in more traditional wholesale and retail markets. 
Today, different contractual arrangements between farmers and traders can be observed.  
Building on primary survey data, we analyze three main aspects. First, we describe 
trade relations of coexisting marketing channels and highlight differences between traditional 
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and modern supply chains. Second, we examine farmers’ subjective motivations to participate 
in particular marketing channels. And third, a choice experiment is used to analyze farmers’ 
attitudes towards contracts and different hypothetical contract designs. 
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. The next section gives some background 
information about the empirical database, the particular study region, and the existing 
marketing channels for sweet pepper in Thailand. Subsequently, different institutional 
arrangements between farmers and traders are compared, and reasons for farmers’ marketing 
decisions are analyzed, before the choice experimental results are discussed. The last section 
concludes. 
 
2. Data Base and Background 
2.1 Data base 
For our empirical study, we conducted a survey of 244 sweet pepper farmers in the Mae Sa 
watershed in Chiang Mai Province, northern Thailand. This watershed is where domestic 
sweet pepper cultivation had started in 1999, and it is still the main production area for sweet 
pepper in Thailand. The survey was conducted between May and July 2007. The Mae Sa 
watershed consists of 22 villages in total, but sweet pepper is cultivated in only 9 villages. In 
2007, 252 farmers grew sweet pepper within these 9 villages. We tried to interview all of 
them, but four farmers were in the process of changing from sweet pepper to tomato 
cultivation, three were traveling outside the village during the survey period and therefore not 
available, and one farmer refused to answer the questionnaire. The 244 remaining sweet 
pepper farmers were interviewed by six trained enumerators from Chiang Mai University. 
Interviews were conducted in Thai, using a structured questionnaire especially designed for 
this research. Farm and farmer characteristics of the sample are displayed in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 here 
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2.2 Marketing channels for sweet pepper 
Sweet pepper was introduced in Thailand in 1999 by a Dutch company. Because of climatic 
conditions, the northern upland areas were the primary target regions, especially those near 
the city of Chiang Mai, where infrastructure and market access conditions were relatively 
favorable. In particular, the company chose the Mae Sa watershed, where farmers were 
contracted to produce red and green sweet pepper in greenhouses, using hydroponics systems 
that make cultivation independent from soil quality conditions (Schipmann and Qaim, 2010). 
Sweet pepper cultivation is labor and input intensive and associated with high capital 
investments, since sophisticated greenhouses are required. Since farms in the watershed are 
predominantly small-scale, with an average farm size of 1.6 acres, the company initially 
provided credit, private extension, and certain inputs to contracted farmers. 
In 2007, three different marketing channels existed for farmers. The first consists of 
private agribusiness firms that deal with sweet pepper for export and for domestic 
supermarkets. Beyond the Dutch company, which had started the business in 1999, two 
additional firms have entered the market more recently. All three companies purchase sweet 
pepper from local farmers. The second marketing channel is the so-called Royal Project, 
which started to deal with sweet pepper in 2002. The Royal Project is a subsidized initiative 
by the King of Thailand to support disadvantaged farmers in the upland areas and offer 
alternatives to opium production, which was widespread in the 1970s and 80s. The Project 
sells vegetables and other agricultural products in upscale retail outlets under its own brand 
name, which Thai consumers recognize as being of very high quality. However, only hill tribe 
farmers, who make up a relatively small part of the population in the Mae Sa watershed, 
officially have access to the Royal Project marketing channel. We consider these first two 
marketing options as modern retail channels. In contrast, the third channel involves traditional 
village traders, who also entered the sweet pepper market more recently. They mostly supply 
traditional wholesale and retail markets in Chiang Mai and Bangkok. 
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Table 2 shows the development of these three marketing channels over time. This 
information was obtained through recall questions during the 2007 survey. In the first two 
years, all farmers sold their sweet pepper through the company channel. However, since 2005 
traditional village traders have constituted the most important marketing channel, while the 
number of farmers supplying a company is steadily decreasing. The role of the Royal Project 
increased over time, but the overall market share remains relatively small. Managers of the 
three companies stated in interviews with us that they did not reduce the cooperation with 
local farmers from their side. Hence, the declining number of company channel suppliers 
appears to be driven mainly by farmer preferences to sell to village traders. Understanding 
such preferences is important to explain farmer participation in modern retail channels. 
Insert Table 2 here 
 
3. Supply Chain Differentiation and Contractual Arrangements 
3.1 Contractual arrangements in different marketing channels 
In a first step, we are interested in the importance of contractual arrangements in the different 
marketing channels. Table 3 shows that more than half of all sweet pepper farmers sell 
without any contractual arrangement. However, not all of these sales are spot-market 
transactions in a narrow sense, because farmers often have long-term informal relationships 
with their buyers without considering this as a binding arrangement. In those cases, concrete 
transactions are not agreed upon in advance, so that farmers remain flexible in their marketing 
decisions. Table 3 also confirms that contractual arrangements are significantly more often 
used in modern than in traditional supply chains.  
Insert Table 3 here 
We further differentiate between oral and written contracts. Oral contracts are 
observed more often, although the picture differs across marketing channels. Private 
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companies in particular use significantly more written contracts. As they are run by non-
locals, company agents are not integrated into the farmers’ social networks; hence, they would 
not trust oral arrangements. This has also been reported in other contexts (Guo et al., 2007; 
Nagaraj et al., 2008). 
 
3.2 Comparison of contract details 
In the literature, it is often separated between production contracts and marketing contracts 
(Guo and Jolly, 2008; Singh, 2002; Wiboonpongse et al., 1998). Even though in our case all 
contractual arrangements comprise some features of both, marketing components dominate in 
contracts with traditional village traders and companies, whereas Royal Project contracts 
focus more directly also on production aspects. 
Table 4 displays aspects that are regulated in contracts, differentiated by marketing 
channel. Most contracts refer to more than one aspect, so that the columns sum up to more 
than 100%. In contracts with village traders, pricing is by far the most important component; 
usually a minimum procurement price is specified. Another important component in village 
trader contracts is the specification of grading criteria. Given that high-value market segments 
for vegetables in Thailand are still emerging, uniform quality standards do not yet exist. In 
contrast, in company contracts the timing of delivery is the central feature, followed by 
pricing and agreements about side selling (i.e., whether or not sales to other buyers are 
allowed). Grading criteria play a smaller role; at least the biggest of the three companies uses 
a grading machine, so that special contractual specifications are not required. In the Royal 
Project channel, most contracts refer to pricing and details about the production process. The 
Royal Project is also the only marketing channel that requires a Good Agricultural Practice 
(GAP) certificate from some suppliers.1 
                                                 
1 Farmers can get a GAP certificate when they produce according to the standard set up by the Thai Ministry of 
Agriculture and Cooperatives for each product. Products produced under the GAP certificate can be sold in retail 
markets under the so-called Q-label (Q standing for quality). 
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Insert Table 4 here 
Another interesting aspect in some contracts relates to input delivery. As village 
traders sometimes also sell inputs to farmers that are not contracted, related details are not 
included in Table 4, but shown separately in Table 5. The first two Table columns compare 
the situation of farmers with and without contract, whereas the other columns further 
differentiate between marketing channels. To facilitate comparisons and better highlight 
differences in contractual details between channels, the group of “no contract” farmers only 
refers to those that sell to traditional village traders without a contract, whereas in the modern 
retail channels, we only consider the majority of farmers that sell under contract. The results 
show that the percentage of farmers who purchase inputs from the same trader that they also 
sell to is significantly higher among contract farmers. Under contract, inputs can be bought on 
credit, whereas non-contract farmers usually have to pay directly in cash. Hence, better access 
to inputs may be one reason for farmers to enter into contractual arrangements, which will be 
analyzed more explicitly further below. Overall, input delivery plays a bigger role in modern 
retail channels than in traditional supply chains. 
Insert Table 5 here 
The lower part of Table 5 provides details about payment modes for sweet pepper 
sales. Here, differences between the marketing channels are less pronounced. Even in the non-
contract village trader channel, most farmers are paid later than one week after product 
delivery. In this connection, observations from different countries can vary widely. For 
instance, Guo et al. (2007) found that payment directly after delivery is the most common 
practice in contract farming in China, whereas Nagaraj et al. (2008) reported that contract 
vegetable farmers in India are often paid with a delay of 15 days or more.  
Looking at the timing of contractual arrangements (Table 6), we find that most 
contracts are made before the production process starts. This holds true in all marketing 
channels, although the share of contracts that are only made before the harvest is bigger in 
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traditional than in modern supply chains. This suggests that contracts with village traders 
provide somewhat greater flexibility for farmers. Yet, in terms of contract duration, Table 6 
shows that almost all contracts are relatively short term in nature, mostly referring to only one 
production season. A similar result was reported by Guo and Jolly (2008). 
Insert Table 6 here 
 
4. Reasons for Farmers’ Marketing Decisions 
After having described the existing marketing channels for sweet pepper and related 
institutional details, we now want to analyze farmers’ motivations behind participating in 
particular channels. In the following, we first compare economic incentives before examining 
subjective reasons as stated by respondents in the interviews. 
 
4.1 Economic incentives 
The first and most obvious potential economic incentive for participating in a particular 
marketing channel is the expected or actual output price received. Table 7 shows how prices 
compare across marketing channels. Sweet pepper prices differ according to color and grade. 
There is green and red sweet pepper, and both colors are traded in the grades AB and C. 
Surprisingly, differences between contract and non-contract transactions are relatively small 
in many cases. Comparing the three contract marketing channels, the Royal Project always 
pays the best price, especially for the higher grade. Yet, these prices are partly subsidized, 
and, as mentioned above, participation in this channel is confined to certain minority groups. 
Companies pay a slightly higher price than village traders for green and a lower price for red 
sweet pepper, yet these differences are not statistically significant. This suggests that price 
differences may not be the main factor explaining farmers’ marketing choices. Similar results 
were also found in other contexts (Hernández et al., 2007; Nagaraj et al., 2007), although 
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there are also examples with more considerable price differences between traditional and 
modern supply chains (Balsevich et al., 2006; Mangala and Chengappa, 2008). 
Insert Table 7 here 
In order to analyze economic incentives more broadly, we compare costs, revenues, 
and gross margins of sweet pepper production across marketing channels in Table 8. Contract 
farmers tend to have higher yields than non-contract farmers, regardless of whether they 
participate in traditional or modern retail channels. This also leads to higher revenues and 
gross margins. These comparisons cannot explain if contract farming leads to changes in crop 
management practices that cause higher yields, or if relatively high yields are a precondition 
for participating in a contract market channel. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
analyze the direction of causality, the results still provide a hint that expected financial 
benefits may play a role for farmers to engage in contractual arrangements. 
Insert Table 8 here 
Comparing the three contract channels, it becomes obvious that participation in the 
Royal Project is particularly lucrative for those farmers who are eligible to this channel. 
Though not statistically significant, mean gross margins are also slightly higher in company 
channels than in village trader contract channels. This can mostly be explained by the greater 
importance of red-colored sweet pepper varieties that fetch higher prices than green ones. 
Hence, modern retail channels seem to offer a certain advantage over traditional markets. The 
fact that many farmers nevertheless drop out of the company channel may potentially be due 
to their inability to produce more red sweet pepper. Another possible reason may be that 
financial incentives are too small to compensate for perceived disadvantages associated with 
supplying companies, such as less flexible contracts. This will be further analyzed below. 
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4.2 Subjective reasons stated by farmers 
Both the number and the share of farmers that supply sweet pepper through company 
channels have declined over time. As shown in Table 2, in 2007, 45 of the 244 sample 
farmers were supplying companies. Yet 109 farmers mentioned that they had supplied 
companies in the past; all 64 company dropouts have switched to supplying village traders. Of 
the 178 village trader suppliers in 2007, 114 have always supplied sweet pepper to village 
traders. Among the Royal Project suppliers in our sample, none reported to have switched 
marketing channels since they started sweet pepper production. Table 9 summarizes the 
farmers’ answers to a question about the most important perceived advantages of their own 
marketing channel in comparison with other alternatives. Only answers from those farmers 
who always supplied the same marketing channel are considered here. 
Insert Table 9 here 
There is a striking difference in stated advantages between non-contract and contract 
village trader suppliers. Whereas price is by far the most important perceived advantage for 
contract suppliers, non-contract farmers value their independence highest, closely followed by 
price, and the ability to discuss with the trader. Hence, losing degrees of freedom and the 
option to negotiate on the spot seem to be important reasons for some farmers not to engage 
in contracts. The statements about price advantages may appear somewhat contradictory; they 
reflect that sweet pepper markets are not always fully transparent. As discussed, actual 
differences in mean prices with and without contract are relatively small. 
For modern retail channel suppliers, assured market access and input provision are the 
most important perceived advantages, suggesting that imperfections in input and output 
markets are generally felt as constraints. This may be due to seasonal market saturation in 
traditional channels and credit constraints, among other reasons. Similarly, Masakure and 
Henson (2005) found market uncertainty as a major reason for vegetable farmers in 
Zimbabwe to contract with an export company, while Minten et al. (2009) identified the 
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option to obtain inputs on credit as an important factor among vegetable producers in 
Madagascar; in both these studies, higher incomes were only mentioned as a minor incentive 
to sign a contract.  
Table 10 looks at statements by farmers who decided to change their marketing 
channel from supplying companies to supplying village traders either with or without 
contract. Knowledge transfer and input provision are the most important reasons why those 
farmers initially supplied a company. This makes sense, because companies had introduced 
sweet pepper in Thailand and were the only buyers of output and sellers of specific inputs 
during the first years. Now that related production technologies are more established, 
company contracts are no longer a precondition for growing sweet pepper. Accordingly, many 
farmers have switched permanently to supplying village traders. Indeed, most of the farmers 
who changed their marketing channel over time had started sweet pepper production in the 
early phase between 1999 and 2001.  
Insert Table 10 here 
When asked about concrete reasons for withdrawing from company channels, many 
farmers named strict and intransparent grading procedures (Table 10). Companies tend to 
grade in the absence of farmers. Moreover, at least one company uses a grading machine, so 
that farmers have no scope for discussion. These results support our earlier finding that there 
is limited trust between farmers and companies. Whereas written contracts can help to 
overcome some problems of trust from the companies’ point of view, they hardly address 
farmers’ concerns, at least not with the design used in this specific context. The second 
important reason stated for withdrawing is price, followed by the preference for 
independence. In a review of different studies, Sartorius and Kirsten (2007) also found that 
distrust, combined with a perceived loss of autonomy, is a major reason for contract failures 
between smallholder farmers and agribusiness companies. 
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Better prices are stated as the main advantage from supplying village traders with or 
without contract by those who switched (third and fourth column of Table 10). As expected, 
non-contract village trader suppliers value independence higher than farmers who entered into 
a new contract. However, the fact that still 11% of the contract suppliers mention 
independence reflects that contracts with village traders are perceived less confining than 
those with companies. 
 
5. Farmers’ Marketing Preferences: A Choice Experiment 
In order to analyze farmers’ attitudes towards contracts and specific contract designs, a choice 
experiment was carried out with all 244 farmers as part of the farm survey.2 Before 
conducting the choice experiment, it was carefully explained to farmers that all contract 
specifications used for this purpose were hypothetical ones, that is, they differed from existing 
contracts in terms of one or more attributes. The attributes and attribute levels used were 
carefully explained. Farmers were assured that their choice of a specific contract design or 
market channel in the experiment would not have any immediate consequence on their actual 
marketing activities. It was clarified that the results would be used more generally to identify 
how trade relations can be designed to be more attractive for farmers. In the following, we 
first describe the experimental design, before discussing the econometric approach and the 
estimation results. 
 
5.1 Experimental design 
The choice experiment method is theoretically based on Lancaster’s model of consumer 
choice and econometrically on random utility models (Adamowicz et al., 1998). The 
                                                 
2 Two farmers did not answer the questions in the choice experiment, so that they were excluded from this 
analysis. 
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underlying assumption is that demand is defined over the characteristics of goods, rather than 
over goods themselves. Therefore, choice experiments consist of different alternatives of a 
good, which contain various attributes with different attribute levels. That is, the respondent 
has to choose a certain combination of attribute levels, which characterize the good, rather 
than the good as such. It is assumed that the respondent chooses the combination, which gives 
the highest subjective level of utility. Choice experiments were initially applied in marketing 
and environmental economics, but recently they found broader application. In our case, we 
apply a choice experiment to identify farmers’ preferences and attitudes towards different 
‘attributes’ of a contractual arrangement. 
Different experimental methods exist, such as contingent ranking, rating, and choice. 
Here we use the contingent choice approach, which is based on Louviere and Woodworth 
(1983); compared to the alternatives it builds on a somewhat more realistic setting, because 
farmers usually only select one out of several possible marketing channels.3 In the 
questionnaire and experimental design, we identified four contract attributes that we felt 
might be of importance for farmers and for which we found differences in the comparison of 
marketing channels These are price, payment mode, input provision, and relation to the trader. 
Price has four levels of valuation, payment mode has two, and the other two attributes have 
three levels each (see Table 11). 
Insert Table 11 here 
This set of attributes and levels implies a total of 72 (4 x 2 x 32) theoretically possible 
alternatives. By using an orthogonal design procedure (Louviere et al., 2000), a fraction of the 
complete factorial design was obtained, giving 16 alternatives to be presented to respondents. 
However, when testing the choice experiment, farmers assessed four of the alternatives to be 
unrealistic. For instance, a combination of the attribute levels ‘not knowing the trader’ with 
‘payment of 25% for a minimum quantity before harvest’ was felt improbable. Following 
                                                 
3 In our sample of 244 farmers, only 8 had more than one marketing channel.  
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other studies (Gonzales et al., 2009), we excluded four unrealistic alternatives; while this 
reduces statistical efficiency (Lanscar and Louviere, 2006) it increases the degree of market 
realism. 
The remaining 12 alternatives were assigned to six choice sets, each comprising three 
alternatives: the first two were taken from the 12 orthogonally designed alternatives, and the 
third always displayed a combination of the lowest levels of all four attributes. In other words, 
the third option portrayed all the characteristics of the marketing situation of village trader 
suppliers without a contract, whereas the other two alternatives described a hypothetical 
marketing option under contract with different contract attributes. The two contract 
alternatives were purposely assigned to a choice set to ensure that none of the options is 
predominant and that attribute levels differ as much as possible. Table A1 in the appendix 
shows the six choice sets and how often a respective alternative was chosen by farmers. 
A choice experiment needs to be carefully planned and implemented as there are 
several factors that might lead to biased results, in particular to an overestimation of 
willingness to pay (for details see Carson and Hanemann, 2005). While some problems are 
more relevant when dealing with public goods, others also need to be considered in a private 
good situation like ours. The most important issue was to avoid receiving dishonest or 
unreliable answers either through the fatigue of respondents or through an inappropriate order 
of choice sets. To avoid fatigue, only four of the six choice sets were shown to each farmer. 
Regarding the order, choice sets were arranged in different sequences, and questionnaires 
were randomly assigned to farmers. This led to the following sample distribution of the 
choice sets: choice sets 1 and 2 were assessed by 163 farmers, choice sets 3 and 6 by 161 
farmers, and choice sets 4 and 5 by 160 farmers, respectively. 
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5.2 Model specification 
The choice data thus obtained were analyzed using a random parameters logit (RPL) model, 
also known as mixed logit (Hole, 2007). There are several advantages over standard logit 
models. RPL models assume preference heterogeneity among respondents, implying that they 
not only estimate the mean of a coefficient, but also the standard deviation of the coefficient’s 
distribution around the mean. When this standard deviation is significant, preference 
heterogeneity for the respective variable exists. Moreover, unrestricted substitution patterns 
are allowed in RPL models, and correlation in unobserved factors is possible, which relaxes 
the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives (Campbell et al., 2006).4 In our 
model, we fix the price coefficient across the population, because we assume that all farmers 
have the same preference for higher prices. The other three attributes are random parameters, 
for which we assume a normal distribution in the sample (Layton and Brown, 2000). 
We employ an alternative specific constant (ASC) for the third alternative, which is 
the non-contract village trader marketing channel. Thus, the estimated ASC coefficient 
reflects the general attitude of farmers towards marketing channels that do not involve 
contractual arrangements. A positive mean coefficient would imply a general preference for 
non-contract alternatives. In a first model specification, we assume that this contract 
preference (or aversion) is uncorrelated with other farm and farmer characteristics. However, 
as some correlation may be expected, we relax this assumption in additional model 
specifications. In a second model, we explore the influence of previous actual experiences of 
farmers with different marketing channels by adding interaction terms between the ASC and 
two dummy variables. The first dummy takes a value of one if farmers were actually 
                                                 
4 The latter also holds true for nested logit models. However, the assumption of nested logit models is that the 
respondent takes decisions stepwise (Hensher et al., 2005), meaning in our context that in a first step the farmer 
decides between contract and non-contract marketing channels and in a second step for a certain alternative of 
these categories. We find it more realistic that farmers first decide whether one of the two contract alternatives is 
attractive to them and if not decide for the non-contract alternative. We therefore prefer the RPL model. The 
estimation results also indicate preference heterogeneity, which is another argument for the RPL model, because 
the nested logit does not account for preference heterogeneity. 
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producing under contract at the time of the interviews in 2007, whereas the second dummy 
takes a value of one if farmers produced under contract previously but had stopped to do so at 
some point. Thus, these interaction terms help to identify whether actual contract experience 
influences general preferences. In a third model, we test the influence of other socioeconomic 
variables. Initially, we included interaction terms between the ASC and all farm and farmer 
characteristics displayed in Table 1. We then excluded all interaction terms that were 
individually and jointly insignificant. 
 
5.3 Estimation results 
The estimation results of the three RPL models are reported in Table 12. Coefficient means as 
well as standard deviations for the random parameters are shown. At first, we concentrate on 
model (1). With the exception of payment mode, all coefficient means are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Results for the standard deviations in the lower part of Table 12 
show that preference heterogeneity exists for all attributes, except for payment mode. This 
confirms the structural advantage of employing the RPL specification. 
Insert Table 12 here 
According to expectations, the coefficient of price is positive, indicating that contracts 
with higher prices increase farmers’ utility and the probability of choosing a contract 
marketing channel. Likewise, input provision, especially when combined with additional 
credit provision, is an incentive for farmers to engage in contracts, confirming some of our 
earlier findings. Personally knowing the buyer also seems to be an important aspect for 
farmers, as indicated by the negative and significant coefficients of the “buyer known through 
others” and “buyer not known” variables. In other words, the less a farmer knows the contract 
agent, the less likely he/she is to choose a contract channel. 
The positive coefficient for the ASC shows that farmers generally prefer a marketing 
channel that does not involve a contract. Yet, preference heterogeneity exists for this variable, 
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so that not all farmers necessarily share the same negative attitude towards contractual 
arrangements. Table 12 also shows the results of our second model, which includes the two 
ASC-contract experience interaction terms as described above. The ASC coefficient itself is 
larger than in the first model, indicating that those without own contract experience have even 
more negative attitudes towards contracts in general. The coefficient of the first interaction 
term is negative and significant, indicating that the negative attitude is reduced among those 
that actually produced under contract in 2007. Given that farmers themselves choose their 
marketing channel, this is plausible. The coefficient of the second interaction term is not 
significant, implying that the hypothesis of equal general attitudes between those who stopped 
producing under contract and those who never had a contract cannot be rejected. 
Model (3) in Table 12 shows that other socioeconomic variables also influence the 
general attitude towards contracts. Several of the interaction terms between the ASC and farm 
and farmer characteristics turned out to be significant. Interesting to observe is that the 
interaction with land owned has a negative coefficient, while the interaction with area under 
sweet pepper has a positive coefficient. Obviously, larger farmers are less averse to contracts, 
unless they specialize on sweet pepper. This makes sense, because not selling through a 
contract involves higher search costs to identify the appropriate marketing channel for sweet 
pepper. Larger farmers who primarily focus on other enterprises may have a higher 
opportunity cost of time, so that they are somewhat more willing to opt for the time-saving 
contract alternative. However, the magnitude of the coefficient is relatively small (-0.11), so 
that a general contract aversion remains, even among the larger farmers.5 For more 
specialized sweet pepper producers, this contract aversion is bigger than that of the average 
producer. They are willing and able to spend more time on sweet pepper marketing. In 
addition, when sweet pepper is their main farming activity, their perceived loss of flexibility 
and autonomy may be bigger when entering into a contract. 
                                                 
5 As was shown in Table 1, the average farm size in the sample is about 4 rai. 
 18
The estimation results further show that farmers with an off-farm occupation are less 
contract-averse than full-time farmers, which is probably also related to their higher 
opportunity cost of time. Finally, the interaction term between the ASC and bad road 
conditions is negative, which seems reasonable. Farmers in villages with bad road conditions 
face higher transport costs and generally have fewer marketing alternatives, so that they are 
much more willing to enter into a contract, when the opportunity arises. The negative 
coefficient estimate of this interaction term is bigger in absolute terms than the ASC 
coefficient itself, indicating that farmers in villages with bad road conditions even have a clear 
preference for selling under contract. 
In summary, with few exceptions, Thai sweet pepper farmers prefer a non-contract 
marketing channel. In terms of contract design, they favor arrangements involving higher 
specified prices and provision of inputs and credit. Moreover, they prefer contracts with 
traders or agents that they know personally. Our findings point in the same direction as those 
by Blandon et al. (2009), who analyzed marketing preferences of fruit and vegetable 
producers in Honduras, yet without explicitly looking at issues of contract design. Overall, 
these results confirm that – in addition to the usual constraints that smallholders face – their 
marketing preferences matter for the question whether or not they participate in modern 
supply chains. 
 
5.4 Willingness to accept analysis 
The estimated parameters from the RPL model can also be used to calculate the willingness to 
pay (WTP) for each single attribute, which further helps to understand respondents’ incentive 
structures and quantify their preference levels. In consumer choice studies, WTP is used, as 
these studies usually explore how much a consumer is willing to pay for a certain attribute 
level that is included in a good they are asked to buy. In our case, however, farmers sell a 
good, so that the original question changes to what price a farmer is willing to accept (WTA), 
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when a certain attribute level of a contract changes. WTA measures can be derived for each 
attribute level by dividing the coefficient of the attribute by the price coefficient and 
multiplying by -1 (Colombo et al., 2005). 
We use the results from model (1) for these calculations, as we are interested in the 
mean values. The highest WTA can be observed for the attribute levels referring to the 
relationship with the buyer. A farmer would require a sweet pepper price that is 55.20 Baht/kg 
higher to enter a contract with a buyer whom he/she does not know personally or through 
others. This is an increase of 127% compared to the average price for red sweet pepper paid 
by a village trader to non-contract farmers. The marginal WTA for entering a contract with a 
buyer that is not known personally but through others is 39.00 Baht/kg, still implying an 
increase of 90%. The WTA for the other significant variables is negative. When chemicals 
and seeds are provided as part of the contract, farmers would accept a price that is 17.33 
Baht/kg (40%) lower than if no inputs are provided (this is net of the actual input cost). When 
inputs and additional credit are provided, the marginal WTA is -22.60 Baht/kg, implying a 
price decrease of 52%. Considering the ASC coefficient, we also find a negative WTA. A 
farmer would accept a price that is 23.00 Baht/kg (53%) lower when a marketing channel 
does not imply a contract of any form. 
The exact WTA values should be interpreted with some caution, and their magnitude 
might have to be discounted somewhat, given the well-known hypothetical bias that stated 
preferences data often suffer from. However, there is no reason to believe that the 
hypothetical bias is stronger for some attributes than for others, so that a relative ranking can 
still be made. In this respect, it is particularly interesting to observe that for farmers the 
positive utility associated with knowing the buyer seems to outweigh the negative utility 
associated with entering a contract in general. This suggests that missing personal links 
between companies and farmers are more important than the fact that there are contracts as 
such for explaining farmers’ withdrawal from the company marketing channel. This is 
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probably related to issues of trust and is an important result for improving contractual 
relationships in high-value markets. 
 
6. Conclusions 
We have analyzed the marketing behavior of sweet pepper farmers in Thailand in the light of 
ongoing market differentiation. In particular, we examined the role and details of contractual 
arrangements to better understand farmers’ market channel choices. Sweet pepper was 
introduced in Thailand some 10 years ago, mainly meant for exports and upscale domestic 
supermarkets. Initially, specialized companies were the only available marketing channel, 
purchasing sweet pepper from farmers via contractual arrangements. More recently, the Royal 
Project, which also caters for modern retail outlets, and traditional village traders entered the 
market. Whereas the Royal Project also mostly works with contracts, many village traders 
purchase sweet pepper from farmers without a contractual arrangement. Over time, village 
traders became the most important marketing channel for sweet pepper; many farmers who 
had previously sold to companies switched to supplying village traders. 
Our descriptive comparison of marketing channels and contract features confirms that 
significant differences exist, which influence farmers’ choices. While output prices matter, 
farmers also value other aspects such as access to inputs, credit, and information, as well as 
independence and flexibility. Contract marketing channels are associated with higher net 
incomes. Strikingly, however, gross margin differences between company and village trader 
contract suppliers are relatively small and not statistically significant. 
A choice experiment was used to analyze farmers’ attitudes towards contracts and 
related details more directly. The results reveal that farmers generally prefer non-contract 
marketing options. Yet there are certain factors that influence this general attitude. In terms of 
farm and farmer characteristics, higher opportunity costs of time and fewer marketing 
alternatives as a result of bad infrastructure conditions increase the attractiveness of entering 
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into a contractual arrangement. In terms of contract design, contracts that also involve the 
provision of inputs and credit are clearly preferred. Remarkably, the most important factor is 
the relationship between farmers and buyers. The positive utility associated with knowing the 
buyer personally seems to outweigh the negative utility associated with entering into a 
contract in general, which is probably related to issues of trust. 
In many developing countries, the role of modern supply chains involving contractual 
agreements between farmers and agribusiness firms or their agents is growing. Hence, the 
question of how smallholder farmers can be linked successfully to these emerging markets is 
of high policy relevance. Much recent work has analyzed factors that might potentially hinder 
smallholder participation, mostly focusing on transaction costs and financial and technical 
constraints. Our results suggest that concentrating on such constraints alone may result in an 
incomplete picture, because farmers’ marketing preferences also matter. This should be 
considered more explicitly in future research. 
For sweet pepper in Thailand, companies have started to establish own integrated 
production plants in peri-urban areas, partly because they find it difficult to source sufficient 
produce from smallholder farmers. Similar trends can also be observed for other high-value 
products and in other countries. Sometimes, integrated production by agribusiness companies 
can generate new employment opportunities for rural households, as was found by Maertens 
and Swinnen (2009) in Senegal. But this cannot always be expected; in Thailand, for instance, 
integrated sweet pepper production is very technology-intensive, with little use of unskilled 
manual labor. Hence, not integrating small farms into modern supply chains more 
successfully can be associated with lost opportunities for rural development. 
Beyond addressing widespread market imperfections, which is certainly important, our 
results suggest that improving the relationship between farmers and buyers could also 
contribute to more widespread smallholder participation in contractual arrangements. Against 
this background, the fact that company representatives and intermediaries are often non-locals 
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is not conducive. One approach could be to more explicitly involve local traders, who have 
established long-term relationships with farmers. Where this is not possible logistically, 
companies and intermediaries could try to improve ties with farmers through other trust-
building mechanisms, such as more frequent personal interactions and more transparent 
pricing and grading procedures. 
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Table 1: Farm and farmer characteristics of sweet pepper farmers, 2007 
Variables 
Full sample Non-contract farmers 
Contract 
farmers 
(N=244) (N=132) (N=112) 
Characteristics of the person responsible for farming decisions 
Female (%) 45.9 50.8 40.2* 
Age in years 42.2 (9.3) 42.4 (9.4) 42.1 (9.3) 
Education in years of 
schooling 6.9 (3.3) 6.8 (3.4) 7.0 (3.2) 
Farm and household characteristics  
Land owned (rai) a 3.9 (6.4) 3.5 (5.8) 4.3 (7.0) 
Sweet pepper area (rai) a 1.3 1.5 (1.3) 1.1*** (0.8) 
Land title b (%) 82.4 93.2 69.6*** 
Farming experience (years) 13.9 (9.4) 13.5 (9.0) 14.4 (9.9) 
Sweet pepper experience 
(years) 
2.7 (1.9) 2.8 (1.9) 2.6 (1.8) 
Pick-up truck (%) 76.6 72.7 81.3 
Off-farm occupation (%) 39.8 40.2 39.3 
Contextual characteristics 
Member in a farm group (%) 82.0 78.8 85.7 
Extension contact (%) 18.0 18.9 17.0 
Good road conditions 78.3 85.6 69.6*** 
Medium road conditions (%) 12.3 9.1 16.1* 
Bad road conditions (%) 9.4 5.3 14.3*** 
Notes: Mean values are shown. For continuous variables, standard deviations are shown in parentheses.      
*, *** differences in mean values between contract and non-contract farmers are significant at the 10% 
and 1% level, respectively. a One rai equals approximately 0.4 acres. b Land title is defined as having a 
land title for at least one of the plots under cultivation. 
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Table 2: Sweet pepper adoption and supply of different marketing channels 
(number of farmers), 1999 - 2007 
 
Year 
Whole 
sample Companies 
Village 
traders 
Royal 
Project 
1999 4 4 0 0 
2000 7 7 0 0 
2001 17 14 3 0 
2002 52 38 12 2 
2003 76 50 22 4 
2004 119 58 51 10 
2005 158 48 92 12 
2006 232 44 167 19 
2007 244 45 178 21 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Importance of contracts by marketing channel (in %), 2007 
 
Contracts 
Whole sample 
(N=244) 
Village 
traders 
(N=178) 
Companies a 
(N=45) 
Royal 
Project b  
(N=21) 
Farmers without 
a contract 
54.10 68.54 13.33*** 19.05*** 
Farmers having 
an oral contract 30.74 26.97 28.89 66.67*** 
Farmers having a 
written contract 15.16 4.49 57.78*** 14.29* 
Notes: *, *** differences are significant at the 10%, and 1% level, respectively.  
a Significance levels in this column refer to the difference between company and village trader 
suppliers.             b Significance levels in this column refer to the difference between Royal Project and 
village trader suppliers. 
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Table 4: Aspects that are regulated in contracts by marketing channel (in %), 
2007 
 
Aspect regulated 
Whole 
sample 
(N=112) 
Village 
traders 
(N=56) 
Companies a 
(N=39) 
Royal 
Project b 
(N=17) 
Side selling 13.39 10.71 23.08 0 
Pricing 47.32 62.5 28.21*** 41.18 
Delivery 33.04 8.93 66.67*** 35.29*** 
Grading 22.32 28.57 12.82* 23.53 
Production process 11.61 7.14 5.13 41.18*** 
GAP 2.68 0 0 17.65*** 
Notes: *, *** differences are significant at the 10% and 1% level, respectively.  
a Significance levels in this column refer to the difference between contract company and contract 
village trader suppliers. b Significance levels in this column refer to the difference between contract 
Royal Project and contract village trader suppliers. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Input delivery and payment mode for output sales (in %), 2007 
 
  Comparison betw. contracts Comparison betw. contract farmers 
Inputs   
No contract 
(N=132) 
Contract a  
(N=112) 
Village 
traders b 
(N=56)       
Companies c 
(N=39) 
Royal 
Project d 
(N=17) 
Input delivery  40.16 74.11*** 58.93** 84.62*** 100*** 
Payment for output sales     
At delivery 22.95 13.39* 17.86 10.26 5.88 
Within one week 25.41 30.36 26.79 41.03 17.65 
Later than one 
week 51.64 56.25 55.36 48.72 76.47 
Notes: *, **, *** differences are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
a Significance levels in this column refer to the difference between contract and non-contract farmers. 
b Significance levels in this column refer to the difference between village trader suppliers with and 
without contract. c Significance levels in this column refer to the difference between contract company 
and contract village trader suppliers. d Significance levels in this column refer to the difference between 
contract Royal Project and contract village trader suppliers. 
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Table 6: Timing and duration of contracts (in %), 2007 
 
Timing 
All contract 
farmers 
(N=112) 
Village traders 
(N=56) 
Companies a 
(N=39) 
Royal Project b 
(N=17) 
Before production 71.43 53.57 87.18*** 94.12*** 
Before harvest 28.57 46.43 12.82*** 5.88*** 
Duration         
One season 91.96 89.29 100.00** 82.35 
Ongoing  8.04 10.71    0.00** 17.65 
Notes: **, *** differences are significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
a Significance levels in this column refer to the difference between contract company and contract 
village trader suppliers. b Significance levels in this column refer to the difference between contract 
Royal Project and contract village trader suppliers. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Average sweet pepper prices (in Thai Baht/kg), 2007 
 
  Non-contract farmers Contract farmers 
Variety and 
grade 
Village traders  
(N=122) 
Village traders a 
(N=56) 
Companies b 
(N=39) 
Royal Project c 
(N=17) 
Green, AB 32.78 30.72 32.99 40.58*** 
Green, C 21.14 19.40 20.09 20.93 
Red, AB 43.37 49.35* 44.79 61.64* 
Red, C 28.66 30.67 28.07 34.03 
Notes: *, *** differences are significant at the 10% and 1% level, respectively.  
a Significance levels in this column refer to the difference between village trader suppliers with and 
without contract. b Significance levels in this column refer to the difference between contract company 
and contract village trader suppliers. c Significance levels in this column refer to the difference between 
contract Royal Project and contract village trader suppliers. 
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Table 8: Gross margin analysis (in Thai Baht/acre), 2007 
 
  Non-contract farmers  Contract farmers 
Particulars 
Village traders 
(N=122) 
 Village traders a 
(N=56) 
Companies b 
(N=39) 
Royal Project c 
(N=17) 
Yield (kg/acre) 6,292  8,028** 8,192 11,335** 
Share of red sweet 
pepper in total (%) 52.13 
 
43.22 79.7*** 70.31** 
Revenues  210,593              284,648***  323,255  576,292***  
Input costs (chemicals 
and organic fertilizer) 55,440 
 
70,280* 77,582 85,917 
Seed costs 18,731            21,875 31,355* 28,804 
Labor costs 9,842  7,061 13,322 15,864 
Total variable costs 84,013  99,216 122,259 130,585 
Gross margin 126,580  185,431**  200,996  445,707***  
Notes: *, **, *** differences are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
a Significance levels in this column refer to the difference between village trader suppliers with and 
without contract. b Significance levels in this column refer to the difference between contract company 
and contract village trader suppliers. c Significance levels in this column refer to the difference between 
contract Royal Project and contract village trader suppliers. 
 
 
 
Table 9: Farmers’ perceived advantages of supplying a particular marketing 
channel (in %), 2007 
 
 Non-contract Contract farmers 
 Village traders
(N=77) 
Village traders 
(N=37) 
Companies    
(N=39) 
Royal 
Project 
(N=17) 
Independence 31 11   
Price 29 43 18 47 
Ability to discuss 23 8   
Personal relation 17 14   
Transport 4 11   
Input provision  14 49 71 
Knowledge transfer   23 52 
Market access   52 53 
Note: Farmers were allowed to mention more than one advantage. Only those who always supplied to 
the same marketing channel are considered. 
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Table 10: Farmers’ stated reasons for changing marketing channels (in %), 2007 
 Initial reasons 
for company 
supply 
(N=64) 
Reasons for 
change 
(N=64) 
Advantages 
from supplying 
village traders 
with contract 
(N=19) 
Advantages 
from supplying 
village traders 
without 
contract (N=45) 
Input provision 41    
Market access 22    
Knowledge transfer 50    
Price  33 58 44 
Independence  19 11 35 
Ability to discuss   16 16 
Personal relation   16 20 
Intransparent 
grading 
 50   
Transport difficulty  8   
Note:  Farmers were allowed to mention more than one reason/advantage. Only those who changed 
their marketing channel over time are considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Marketing channel attributes and attribute levels used in the choice 
experiment 
 
  Attribute levels 
Attribute  1 2 3 4 
Price in Thai Baht/kg Market price + 5 + 15 + 25 
Input/credit provision None Seeds and chemicals Seeds, chemicals, and additional credit  
Payment mode Payment at delivery 
25% of expected minimum 
payment is paid a month 
before harvest starts 
  
Relation to the buyer 
Buyer is 
personally 
known 
Buyer is known through other 
village traders 
Buyer is not known  
at all  
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Table 12: Random parameter logit models for farmers’ market channel choice 
 
Attributes  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
Mean parameter       
Price 0.06*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01) 0.06*** (0.01) 
ASC a 1.38*** (0.45) 2.72*** (0.65) 2.04*** (0.62) 
Input provision b 1.04*** (0.27) 1.03*** (0.27) 0.99*** (0.26) 
Input and credit provision b 1.30*** (0.40) 1.38*** (0.40) 1.31*** (0.39) 
Payment in advance 0.19 (0.24) 0.18 (0.24) 0.08 (0.24) 
Buyer known through others c -2.34*** (0.41) -2.72*** (0.44) -2.62*** (0.50) 
Buyer not known c -3.31*** (0.40) -3.43*** (0.41) -3.68*** (0.54) 
ASC x contract in 2007   -2.45*** (0.69)   
ASC x previous contract    -0.43 (0.80)   
ASC x land owned in rai     -0.11*** (0.04) 
ASC x area cultivated with sweet 
pepper     0.50** (0.25) 
ASC x off-farm occupation     -1.20** (0.54) 
ASC x medium road conditions d      -0.80 (0.82) 
ASC x bad road conditions d     -4.00*** (1.03) 
Standard deviation parameter       
ASC 3.93*** (0.45) 3.90*** (0.48) 3.51*** (0.45) 
Input provision 0.63* (0.34) 0.47 (0.33) -0.17 (0.49) 
Input and credit provision -1.27** (0.59) -1.00** (0.51) 0.84 (0.65) 
Payment in advance -0.18 (0.38) -0.31 (0.44)  -0.30 (0.31) 
Buyer known through others 0.97* (0.58) -1.40*** (0.45) 1.28** (0.54) 
Buyer not known 2.04*** (0.43) -2.03*** (0.42) -2.41*** (0.51) 
Log likelihood -653.76 -633.44 -628.04 
Chi-squared 309.91*** 287.95*** 258.92*** 
Notes: The number of observations is n = 3*4*242=2,904. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.  
*, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
a ASC stands for alternative specific constant. As explained in the text, this refers to the non-contract 
trade relation alternative in our specification. b Reference category is no input provision. c Reference 
category is buyer is known personally. d Reference category is good road conditions. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Choice sets and frequency of selection of alternatives by farmers 
 
Attribute Price in Thai Baht/kg Input/credit provision Payment mode Relation to the buyer 
Frequency of 
selection (%) 
Choice set 1           
Contract alternative 
one  + 25 Baht/kg  
Seeds, chemicals, and 
additional credit Payment at delivery 
Buyer is known through 
other village traders 9.8 
Contract alternative 
two + 25 Baht/kg  Seeds and chemicals 
25% of expected 
minimum payment is 
paid a month before 
harvest starts 
Buyer is personally 
known 50.3 
Non-contract 
alternative Market price None Payment at delivery 
Buyer is personally 
known 39.9 
Choice set 2          
Contract alternative 
one  + 15 Baht/kg  None 
25% of expected 
minimum payment is 
paid a month before 
harvest starts 
Buyer is personally 
known 47.2 
Contract alternative 
two  + 15 Baht/kg  None Payment at delivery 
Buyer is known through 
other village traders 7.4 
Non-contract 
alternative Market price None Payment at delivery 
Buyer is personally 
known 45.4 
Choice set 3          
Contract alternative 
one  + 25 Baht/kg  None 
25% of expected 
minimum payment is 
paid a month before 
harvest starts 
Buyer is known through 
other village traders 18.6 
Contract alternative 
two Market price Seeds and chemicals Payment at delivery 
Buyer is not known at 
all 11.2 
Non-contract 
alternative Market price None Payment at delivery 
Buyer is personally 
known 70.2 
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Attribute Price in Thai Baht/kg Input/credit provision Payment mode Relation to the buyer 
Frequency of 
selection (%) 
Choice set 4           
Contract alternative 
one  + 15 Baht/kg  Seeds and chemicals Payment at delivery 
Buyer is not known at 
all 24.4 
Contract alternative 
two  + 5 Baht/kg  None 
25% of expected 
minimum payment is 
paid a month before 
harvest starts 
Buyer is personally 
known 
4.4 
Non-contract 
alternative Market price None Payment at delivery 
Buyer is personally 
known 71.2 
Choice set 5           
Contract alternative 
one Market price 
Seeds, chemicals, and 
additional credit 
25% of expected 
minimum payment is 
paid a month before 
harvest starts 
Buyer is personally 
known 
6.9 
Contract alternative 
two  + 5 Baht/kg  
Seeds, chemicals, and 
additional credit Payment at delivery 
Buyer is personally 
known 46.2 
Non-contract 
alternative Market price None Payment at delivery 
Buyer is personally 
known 46.8 
Choice set 6           
Contract alternative 
one  + 5 Baht/kg  None Payment at delivery 
Buyer is not known at 
all 8.7 
Contract alternative 
two Market price None 
25% of expected 
minimum payment is 
paid a month before 
harvest starts 
Buyer is known through 
other village traders 
11.8 
Non-contract 
alternative Market price None Payment at delivery 
Buyer is personally 
known 79.5 
 
 
